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Abstract
We define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have dispropor-
tionately large effects. In a model of financial intermediation, we show
that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset-price
volatility or bank defaults or both. Furthermore, as the liquidity shocks
become vanishingly small, the asset-price volatility is bounded away from
zero. In the limit economy, with no shocks, there are many equilibria;
however, the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small
liquidity shocks are those with non-trivial sunspot activity.
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1 Excess sensitivity and sunspots
There are numerous historical examples of financial fragility, where shocks that
are small in relation to the economy as a whole have a significant impact on the
financial system. For example, Kindleberger (1978, pp. 107-108) argues that
the immediate cause of a financial crisis
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“... may be trivial, a bankruptcy, a suicide, a flight, a revelation, a
refusal of credit to some borrower, some change of view which leads
a significant actor to unload. Prices fall. Expectations are reversed.
The movement picks up speed. To the extent that speculators are
leveraged with borrowed money, the decline in prices leads to further
calls on them for margin or cash, and to further liquidation. As
prices fall further, bank loans turn sour, and one or more mercantile
houses, banks, discount houses, or brokerages fail. The credit system
itself appears shaky and the race for liquidity is on.”
Schnabel and Shin (2002) document one such example, the financial crisis of
1763. They argue that the bankruptcy of the de Neufville brothers’ banking
house forced them to sell their stocks of commodities. In the short run, the
liquidity of the market was limited and the commodity sales resulted in lower
prices. The fall in prices in turn put other intermediaries under strain and forced
them to sell. A collapse in commodity prices and a financial crisis followed.
Schnabel and Shin draw a parallel between the 1763 crisis and the Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) episode in 1998. They suggest that, without the
rescue coordinated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, there might have
been a collapse in asset prices and a widespread financial crisis.
In this paper, we use the term crisis to mean a profound drop in the value
of asset prices which affects the solvency of a large number of banks and their
ability to meet their commitments to depositors. If the price movement is large
enough, some banks are forced into liquidation; but there may also be crises in
which banks avoid default, although their balance sheet is under extreme pres-
sure. It is well known that sufficiently large exogenous shocks can cause a crisis.
For example, Allen and Gale (1998) describe a model in which financial crises
are caused by exogenous asset-return shocks. Following a large (negative) shock
to asset returns, banks are unable to meet their commitments and are forced
to default and liquidate assets. In the current paper we investigate endogenous
crises, where small or negligible shocks set off self-reinforcing and self-amplifying
price changes. We use a simple version of the general equilibrium model intro-
duced in Allen and Gale (2003), henceforth AG. The key element of the model
is the role of liquidity in determining asset prices. The supply of liquidity is
determined by the banks’ initial portfolio choices. Subsequently, small shocks
to the demand for liquidity, interacting with the fixed supply, cause a collapse
in asset prices.
We model liquidity preference, in the standard way, by assuming that con-
sumers have stochastic time preferences. There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2,
where contracts are drawn up at date 0 and all consumption occurs at dates
1 and 2. There are two types of consumers, early consumers, who only value
consumption at date 1 and late consumers, who only value consumption at date
2. Consumers are identical at date 0 and learn their true type, “early” or “late”,
at the beginning of date 1.
There are two types of investments in this economy, short-term investments,
which yield a return after one period and long-term investments, which take two
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periods to mature. There is a trade-off between liquidity and returns: long-term
investments have higher returns but take longer to mature (are less liquid). By
contrast, there is no risk-return tradeoff: we assume that asset returns are non-
stochastic to emphasize the fact that, in the present model, financial crises are
not driven by shocks asset returns. For an example of a more general model of
financial crises, including a risk-return tradeoff, see Allen and Gale (2003).
Banks are modeled as risk-sharing institutions that pool consumers’ endow-
ments and invest them in a portfolio of long- and short-term investments. In
exchange for their endowments, banks give consumers a deposit contract, which
is an option to receive either a fixed amount of consumption at date 1 or a
fixed amount of consumption at date 2. The deposit contract provides con-
sumers with insurance against liquidity shocks by intertemporally smoothing
the returns paid on deposits. There is free entry into the banking sector: in a
competitive equilibrium banks must maximize the expected utility of depositors
in order to attract customers.
Once the supply of liquidity is fixed by the banks’ portfolio decisions, shocks
to the demand for liquidity can cause substantial asset-price volatility and/or
default. The supply of liquidity is fixed in the short run by the banks’ portfolio
decisions at date 0. In the absence of default, the demand for liquidity is per-
fectly inelastic in the short run. If the banks’ supply of liquidity is sufficient to
meet the depositors’ demand when liquidity preference is high, there must be
an excess supply of liquidity when liquidity preference is low. The banks will
only be willing to hold this excess liquidity between dates 1 and 2 if the interest
rate is zero (the price of date 2 consumption in terms of date 1 consumption
is 1). A low interest rate implies that asset prices are correspondingly high.
However, asset prices cannot be high in all states or the short asset would be
dominated at date 0 and no one would be willing to hold it. So, in the absence
of default, there will be substantial price volatility. Note that this argument
does not require large shocks to liquidity demand.
We define a financial system to be fragile if a small aggregate shock in the
demand for liquidity leads to disproportionately large effects in terms of asset-
price volatility or default. One test for financial fragility is to allow the shocks
to become vanishingly small and see whether the effects disappear in the limit.
If they do not, we can say that the system is fragile because the shocks are
infinitesimal relative to the consequences. As we argued above, there must be
either substantial asset-price volatility or default, or both, regardless of the size
of the shocks. In fact, we can show that we must have positive asset-price
volatility even in the case of default. Further, we can show that this volatility is
bounded away from zero as the variance of the shocks becomes vanishingly small.
In the limit, the volatility of asset prices is disproportionately large relative to
the shocks, that is, the financial system is fragile.
In the limit, when the shocks become vanishingly small, there is no aggre-
gate exogenous uncertainty, but this does not mean that there is no endogenous
uncertainty. We distinguish two kinds of uncertainty. Intrinsic uncertainty is
caused by stochastic fluctuations in the primitives or fundamentals of the econ-
omy. Examples would be exogenous shocks that effect liquidity preferences or
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asset returns. Extrinsic uncertainty by definition has no effect on the funda-
mentals of the economy. An equilibrium with no extrinsic uncertainty is called a
fundamental equilibrium, because the endogenous variables are functions of the
exogenous primitives or fundamentals of the model (endowments, preferences,
technologies). An equilibrium with extrinsic uncertainty is called a sunspot
equilibrium,1 because endogenous variables may be influenced by extraneous
variables (sunspots) that have no direct impact on fundamentals. A crisis can-
not occur in a fundamental equilibrium in the absence of exogenous shocks to
fundamentals such as asset returns or liquidity demands. In a sunspot equilib-
rium, by contrast, asset prices fluctuate in the absence of aggregate exogenous
shocks and crises appear to occur spontaneously.
There are multiple equilibria in the limit economy with no aggregate exoge-
nous uncertainty. Some of these equilibria are characterized by financial crises
and some are not. Which type of equilibrium is most likely to be observed?
To test the robustness of a given equilibrium in the limit economy, we perturb
the economy by introducing a small amount of aggregate uncertainty and ask
whether there exists an equilibrium of the perturbed economy that is close to
the given equilibrium. If the answer is “yes,” we describe the equilibrium as
robust. Equivalently, we say that an equilibrium is robust if it is the limit of
a sequence of equilibria, corresponding to a sequence of perturbed economies,
as the shocks become vanishingly small. We already know which equilibria are
robust in this sense. We have seen that any equilibrium of the perturbed econ-
omy is characterized by asset-price volatility that is bounded away from zero as
the aggregate liquidity shocks converge to zero. Thus, a robust equilibrium of
the limit economy must have extrinsic uncertainty. Conversely, the fundamental
equilibrium of the limit economy is not robust.2
These results help us understand the relationship between two traditional
views of financial crises. One view is that they are spontaneous events, unrelated
to changes in the real economy. Historically, banking panics were attributed to
“mob psychology” or “mass hysteria” (see, e.g., Kindleberger (1978)). The
modern version of this theory explains banking panics as equilibrium coordi-
nation failures (Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). An alternative
view is that financial crises are a natural outgrowth of the business cycle (Gor-
ton (1988), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Calomiris and Mason (2000), Allen
and Gale (1998, 2000a-d)). Our model combines the most attractive features
of both traditional approaches. Like the sunspot approach, it produces large
1The theoretical analysis of sunspot equilibria began with the seminal work of Cass and
Shell (1982) and Azariadis (1981), which gave rise to two streams of literature. The Cass-
Shell paper is most closely related to work in a Walrasian, general-equilibrium framework;
the Azariadis paper is most closely related to the macroeconomic dynamics literature. For
a useful survey of applications in macroeconomics, see Farmer (1999); for an example of the
current literature in the general equilibrium framework see Gottardi and Kajii (1995, 1999).
2The limit economy has two types of equilibria with extrinsic uncertainty. In a trivial
sunspot equilibrium, prices are random but the allocation is essentially the same as in the
fundamental equilibrium and no banks default. In a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium, the
equilibrium allocation is random as well as the prices.
4
effects from small shocks.3 Like the real business cycle approach, it makes a
firm prediction about the conditions under which crises will occur.4
There are important differences between the present model of systemic or
economy-wide crises and models of individual bank runs or panics (Bryant,
1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In our model a crisis is a systemic event.
It occurs only if the number of defaulting banks is large enough to affect the
equilibrium asset price. In the panic model, by contrast, bank runs are an
idiosyncratic phenomenon. Whether a run occurs at a particular bank depends
on the decisions taken by the bank’s depositors, independently of what happens
at other banks. It is only by coincidence that runs are experienced by several
banks at the same time.
Another difference between panics and crises has to do with reasons for
the default. In the Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig story, bank runs are spontaneous
events that depend on the decisions of late consumers to withdraw early. Given
that almost all agents withdraw at date 1, early withdrawal is a best response
for every agent; but if late consumers were to withdraw at date 2, then late
withdrawal is a best response for every late consumer. So there are two “equi-
libria” of the coordination game played by agents at date 1, one with a bank
run and one without. This kind of coordination failure plays no role in the
present model. In fact, coordination failure is explicitly ruled out: a bank run
occurs only if the bank cannot simultaneously satisfy its budget constraint and
its incentive constraint.5 From the point of view of a single, price-taking bank,
default results from an exogenous shock. When bankruptcy does occur, it is
the result of low asset prices. Asset prices are endogenous, of course, and there
is a “self-fulfilling” element in the relationship between asset prices and crises.
Banks are forced to default and liquidate assets because asset prices are low and
asset prices are low as a result of mass bankruptcy and the associated liquidation
of bank assets.
An interesting feature of the model is the role of mixed equilibria, in which
ex ante identical banks have to choose different strategies. For some parameter
specifications, we can show that one group of banks will follow a risky strategy
by investing almost all of their funds in the long asset. They meet their demands
for liquidity by selling the asset in the market. Another group of banks follow a
safe strategy and hold a large amount of the short asset. The safe banks provide
liquidity to the risky banks by purchasing the risky banks’ long-term assets.
Safe banks also provide liquidity to each other: because there are idiosyncratic
3Strictly speaking, much of the banking literature exploits multiple equilibria without ad-
dressing the issue of sunspots. We adopt the sunspots framework here because it encompasses
the standard notion of equilibrium and allows us to address the issue of equilibrium selection.
4Models of sunspot phenomena typically have many equilibrium, including as a special
case the fundamental equilibria in which extrinsic uncertainty has no effect on endogenous
variables. Thus, financial fragility remains a possibility but not a necessity.
5This is a refinement of the equilibrium concept. We assume that late consumers withdraw
at the last date whenever it is incentive compatible for them to do so. Bank runs occur only
when it is impossible for the bank to meet its obligations in an incentive-compatible way. Such
runs are called essential in AG to distinguish them from the coordination failures in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983).
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shocks to liquidity demand, the safe banks with a high demand for liquidity sell
long-term assets to those with a low demand.
Our work is related to the wider literature on general equilibrium with incom-
plete markets (GEI). As is well known, sunspots do not matter when markets are
complete. (For a precise statement, see Shell and Goenka, 1997). The incom-
pleteness in our model reveals itself in two ways. First, sunspots are assumed to
be non-contractible, that is, the deposit contract is not explicitly contingent on
the sunspot variable. In this respect we are simply following the incomplete con-
tracts literature (see, for example, Hart, 1995). Secondly, there are no markets
for Arrow securities contingent on the sunspot variable, so financial institutions
cannot insure themselves against asset price fluctuations associated with the
sunspot variable. This is the standard assumption of the GEI literature (see,
for example, Geanakoplos et al., 1990 or Magill and Quinzii, 1996).
There is a small but growing literature related to financial fragility. Financial
multipliers were introduced by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). In the model of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the impact of illiquidity at one link in the credit
chain has a large impact further down the chain. Chari and Kehoe (2000) show
that herding behavior can cause a small information shock to have a large effect
on capital flows. Lagunoff and Schreft (2001) show how overlapping claims
on firms can cause small shocks to lead to widespread bankruptcy. Bernardo
and Welch (2002) develop a model of runs on financial markets and asset price
collapses based on the anticipation of liquidity needs.
Postlewaite et al. (2003) study a model in which transactions in a competi-
tive market are preceded by fixed investments. They show that, in the absence
of forward contracts, equilibrium spot prices are highly volatile even when the
degree of uncertainty is very small.
Allen and Gale (2003) provide a more general model of which the present
model is a very special case. The focus of that paper is on the welfare properties
of equilibrium rather than financial fragility. For example, it is shown that with
complete markets for aggregate risks the laisser-faire equilibrium is incentive-
efficient or constrained-efficient, depending on whether intermediaries can use
general incentive-compatible contracts or incomplete contracts. By contrast,
if markets are incomplete, there may be too much or too little liquidity and
government regulation may be welfare-improving. There is no discussion of the
sensitivity of equilibrium too small shocks, which is the central point of the
present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic
assumptions of the model. Section 3 describes the optimal contracts offered
by banks and the rules governing default and liquidation. Section 4 defines
equilibrium. A special case of the model and a numerical example are considered
in Section 5. Section 6 contains a full analysis of the equilibria of the economy.
We first consider the limit economy with no aggregate uncertainty and then
perturb the economy by introducing aggregate uncertainty. We show that, in
any equilibrium of the economy with aggregate uncertainty, crises occur with
positive probability. We also show that the limit of a sequence of equilibria
corresponding to a sequence of perturbed economies is an equilibrium in the
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limit economy and we characterize the limit equilibria. Section 7 contains a
discussion. Proofs are gathered in Section 8.
2 Assets and preferences
The model we use is a special case of AG.
Dates. There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and a single good at each date. The
good can be used for consumption or investment.
Assets. There are two assets, a short-term asset (the short asset) and a long-
term asset (the long asset).
• The short asset is represented by a storage technology. Investment in the
short asset can take place at date 1 or date 2. One unit of the good
invested at date t yields one unit at date t+ 1, for t = 0, 1.
• The long asset takes two periods to mature and is more productive than
the short asset. Investment in the long asset can only take place at date
0. One unit invested at date 0 produces r > 1 units at date 2.
Consumers. There is a continuum of ex ante identical consumers, whose measure
is normalized to unity. Each consumer has an endowment (1, 0, 0) consisting of
one unit of the good at date 0 and nothing at subsequent dates. There are
two (ex post) types of consumers at date 1, early consumers, who only value
consumption at date 1, and late consumers, who only value consumption at
date 2. If η denotes the probability of being an early consumer and ct denotes
consumption at date t = 1, 2, the consumer’s ex ante utility is
u(c1, c2; η) = ηU(c1) + (1− η)U(c2).
The period utility function U : R+→ R is twice continuously differentiable and
satisfies the usual neoclassical properties, U 0(c) > 0, U 00(c) < 0, and limc&0 U 0(c) =
∞.
Uncertainty. There are three sources of intrinsic uncertainty in the model. First,
each individual consumer faces idiosyncratic uncertainty about her preference
type (early or late consumer). Secondly, each bank faces idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty about the number of early consumers among the bank’s depositors. For
example, different banks could be located in regions subject to independent liq-
uidity shocks. Thirdly, there is aggregate uncertainty about the fraction of early
consumers in the economy. Aggregate uncertainty is represented by a state of
nature θ, a non-degenerate random variable with a finite support and a den-
sity function f(θ). The bank’s idiosyncratic shock is represented by a random
variable α, with finite support and a density function g(α). The probability of
being an early consumer at a bank in state (α, θ) is denoted by η(α, θ), where
η(α, θ) ≡ α+ εθ
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and ε ≥ 0 is a constant. We adopt the usual “law of large numbers” convention
and assume that the fraction of early consumers at a bank in state (α, θ) is
identically equal to the probability η(α, θ). The economy-wide average of α is
assumed to be constant and equal to the mean α¯ =
P
αg(α). Thus, there is
aggregate intrinsic uncertainty only if ε > 0.
Information. All uncertainty is resolved at date 1. The true value of θ is
publicly observed,6 the true value of α for each bank is publicly observed, and
each consumer learns his type, i.e., whether he is an early consumer or a late
consumer.
Asset markets. There are no asset markets for hedging against aggregate uncer-
tainty at date 0, for example, there are no Arrow securities contingent on the
state of nature θ. At date 1, there is a market in which future (date-2) con-
sumption can be exchanged for present (date-1) consumption. If p(θ) denotes
the price of future consumption in terms of present consumption at date 1, then
one unit of the long asset is worth p(θ)r at date 1 in state θ.
Markets are incomplete at date 0 but complete at date 1. We assume that
market participation is incomplete: financial institutions such as banks can
participate in the asset market at date 1 but individual consumers cannot.7
3 Banking
Banks are financial institutions that provide investment and liquidity services to
consumers. They do this by pooling the consumers’ resources, investing them
in a portfolio of short- and long-term assets, and offering consumers future
consumption streams with a better combination of asset returns and liquidity
than individual consumers could achieve by themselves. Banks also have access
to the interbank capital market, from which consumers are excluded.
Banks compete by offering deposit contracts to consumers in exchange for
their endowments and consumers respond by choosing the most attractive of the
contracts offered. Free entry ensures that banks earn zero profits in equilibrium.
The deposit contracts offered in equilibrium must maximize consumers’ welfare
subject to the zero-profit constraint. Otherwise, a bank could enter and make
a positive profit by offering a more attractive contract.
Anything a consumer can do, the bank can do. So there is no loss of gen-
erality in assuming that consumers deposit their entire endowment in a bank
at date 0.8 The bank invests y units per capita in the short asset and 1 − y
units per capita in the long asset and offers each consumer a deposit contract,
6 It is not strictly necessary to assume that θ is observed. In equilibrium, all that agents
need to know is the equilibrium price p(θ), which may or may not reveal θ.
7As Cone (1983) and Jacklin (1986) showed, if consumers have access to the capital market,
it is impossible for banks to offer risk sharing that is superior to the market.
8This is not simply an application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. The consumer may
do strictly better by putting all his “eggs” in the bank’s “basket”. Suppose that the deposit
contract allows the individual to hold m units in the safe asset and deposit 1−m units in the
bank. The bank invests y in the short asset and 1−m− y in the long asset. If the bank does
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which allows the consumer to withdraw either d1 units at date 1 or d2 units at
date 2. Without loss of generality, we set d2 =∞. This ensures that consumers
receive the residue of the bank’s assets at date 2. Then the deposit contract is
characterized by the middle-period payment d1 ≡ d.
If p(θ) denotes the price of future consumption at date 1 in state θ, then the
value of the bank’s assets at date 1 is y + p(θ)r(1− y).
A consumer’s type is private information. An early consumer cannot mis-
represent his type because he needs to consume at date 1; but a late consumer
can claim to be an early consumer, withdraw d at date 1, store it until date 2
and then consume it. The deposit contract is incentive compatible if and only
if the residual payment to late consumers at date 2 is at least d. Since the late
consumers are residual claimants at date 2, it is possible to give them at least
d units of consumption if and only if
η(α, θ)d+ (1− η(α, θ))p(θ)d ≤ y + p(θ)r(1− y). (1)
The left hand side is a lower bound for the present value of consumption when
early consumers are given d and late consumers are given at least d. The right
hand side is the value of the portfolio. Thus, condition (1) is necessary and
sufficient for the deposit contract d to satisfy incentive compatibility and the
budget constraint simultaneously. We often refer to the inequality in (1) as the
incentive constraint for short.
In what follows, we assume that bank runs occur only if they are unavoidable.
In other words, late consumers will withdraw at date 2 as long as the bank can
satisfy the incentive constraint. If (1) is violated, then all consumers will want
to withdraw at date 1. In the event of bankruptcy, the bank is required to
liquidate its assets in an attempt to provide the promised amount d to the
consumers who withdraw at date 1. Whatever withdrawal decisions consumers
make, the consumers who withdraw at date 2 will receive less than the consumers
who withdraw at date 1. Hence, in equilibrium, all consumers must withdraw
at date 1. Then each consumer receives the liquidated value of the portfolio
y + p(θ)r(1− y).
not default at date 1, the early consumers receive d+m and the late consumers receive
p(θ)r(1−m− y) + y − η(θ)d
(1− η(θ))p(θ)
+m.
If the bank defaults, early and late consumers receive
p(θ)r(1−m− y) + y +m.
Suppose that m > 0 and consider a reduction in m and an increase in y and d of the same
amount. It is clear that the early consumers’ consumption is unchanged. So is the late
consumers’ consumption if the bank defaults. The change in the late consumers’ consumption
when the bank does not default is
∆y − η(θ)∆d
(1− η(θ))p(θ)
+∆m = −∆m
p(θ)
+∆m ≥ 0
because p(θ) ≤ 1 and ∆m < 0. Thus, it is optimal for the bank (and for the consumer) to
choose m = 0.
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Let xt(d, y, α, θ) denote the consumption at date t if the bank chooses (d, y)
and the bank is in state (α, θ) at date 1. Let x = (x1, x2), where
x1(d, y, α, θ) =
½
d if (1) is satisfied
y + p(θ)r(1− y) otherwise,
x2(d, y, α, θ) =
(
y+p(θ)r(1−y)−ηd
(1−η)p(θ) if (1) is satisfied
y + p(θ)r(1− y) otherwise,
and η = η(α, θ). Using this notation, the bank’s decision problem can be written
as
max E [u (x(d, y, α, θ), η(α, θ))]
s.t. 0 ≤ d, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. (DP1)
An ordered pair (d, y) is optimal for the given price function p(·) if it solves
(DP1).
4 Equilibrium
The bank’s decision problem is “non-convex”. To ensure the existence of equi-
librium, we take advantage of the convexifying effect of large numbers and allow
for the possibility that ex ante identical banks will choose different deposit con-
tracts d and portfolios y. Each consumer is assumed to deal with a single bank
and each bank offers a single contract. In equilibrium, consumers will be indiffer-
ent between banks offering different contracts. Consumers allocate themselves
to different banks in proportions consistent with equilibrium.
To describe an equilibrium, we need some additional notation. A partition of
consumers at date 0 is defined by an integerm <∞ and an array ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρm)
of numbers ρi ≥ 0 such that
Pm
i=1 ρi = 1. Consumers are divided into m groups
and each group i contains a measure ρi of consumers. We impose an arbitrary
bound m on the number of groups to rule out pathological cases.9 The banks
associated with group i offer a deposit contract di and a portfolio yi, both
expressed in per capita terms. An allocation consists of a partition (m, ρ) and
an array (d, y) = {(di, yi)}mi=1 such that di ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 for i = 1, ...,m.
To define the market clearing conditions we need some additional notation.
Let x¯(di, yi, α, θ) = (x¯1(di, yi, α, θ), x¯2(di, yi, α, θ)) denote the bank’s demand
for goods. If the bank is solvent then a fraction η(α, θ) get paid x1 (di, yi, α, θ)
at date 1 and a fraction (1 − η(di, yi, α, θ)) get paid x2(di, yi, α, θ)) at date 2.
Then the bank’s total demand for goods is given by
x¯(di, yi, α, θ) = (η(α, θ)x1 (di, yi, α, θ) , (1− η(di, yi, α, θ))x2(di, yi, α, θ)).
If the bank is bankrupt, on the other hand, then everyone gets paid x1(di, yi, α, θ) =
x2(di, yi, α, θ) at date 1 and the bank’s total demand for goods is
x¯(di, yi, α, θ) = (x1(di, yi, α, θ), 0).
9 In general, two groups are sufficient for existence of equilibrium.
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An allocation (m, ρ, d, y) is attainable if it satisfies the market-clearing condi-
tions X
i
ρiE [x¯1(di, yi, α, θ)] ≤
X
i
ρiyi, (2)
andX
i
ρi {E [x¯1(di, yi, α, θ) + x¯2(di, yi, α, θ])}
=
X
i
ρi {yi + r(1− yi)} ,
for any state θ. In the market-clearing conditions, we take expectations with
respect to α because the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is
assumed to be the same as the probability distribution. The first inequality
says that the total demand for consumption at date 1 is less than or equal to
the supply of the short asset. The inequality may be strict, because an excess
supply of liquidity can be re-invested in the short asset and consumed at date
2. The second condition says that total consumption at date 2 is equal to the
return from the investment in the long asset plus the amount invested in the
short asset at date 1, which is the difference between the left and right hand
sides of (2).
In equilibrium, it must be the case that p(θ) ≤ 1. Otherwise banks could
make an arbitrage profit at date 1 by selling goods forward and investing the
proceeds in the short asset. If p(θ) < 1 then no one is willing to invest in the
short asset at date 1 and (2) must hold as an equation. A price function p(·) is
admissible (for the given allocation) if it satisfies the following complementary
slackness condition:
For any state θ, p(θ) ≤ 1 and p(θ) < 1 implies that (2)
holds as an equation.
Now we are ready to define an equilibrium.
An equilibrium consists of an attainable allocation (m,ρ, d, y) and an admis-
sible price function p(·) such that, for every group i = 1, ...,m, (di, yi) is optimal
given the price function p(·).
5 A first look at equilibrium
In this section we use a simple parametric example to illustrate the properties
of the model. We will see that relatively small shocks to liquidity demand have
substantial effects on asset-price volatility and the possibility of default. Asset-
price volatility and bank defaults have real effects on the equilibrium allocations
and the welfare of individuals. Furthermore, these real effects remain substantial
even as the liquidity shocks that cause them become vanishingly small. This is
a clear example of financial fragility, defined as excess sensitivity to small shocks
(and, in the limit, to no shocks at all).
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Recall that the fraction of early consumers in any bank is η(α, θ) = α+ εθ,
where α is an idiosyncratic (bank-specific) shock and θ is an aggregate shock.
For simplicity, we assume that the random variables α and θ have two-point
supports, that is,
α =
½
αH w. pr. 0.5,
αL w. pr. 0.5,
where 0 < αL < αH < 1, and
θ =
½
0 w. pr. π,
1 w. pr. (1− π),
where 0 < π < 1. Because there are only two values of θ the price of future
consumption at date 1 takes at most two values, p(0) and p(1).
Safe banks
Suppose that a bank chooses a deposit contract d and a portfolio y such that it
never has to default in equilibrium. Then in each state θ, the early consumers
will receive the promised payment c1(α, θ) = d at date 1 and the late consumers
will receive the residue of the bank’s portfolio at date 2. The budget constraint
implies that the consumption of the late consumers is
c2(α, θ) =
y + p(θ)r(1− y)− η(α, θ)d
p(θ)(1− η(α, θ)) .
By assumption, the incentive constraint c2(α, θ) ≥ d is satisfied in every state
(α, θ). Thus, the bank’s decision problem is to choose the ordered pair (d, y) to
max E [ηU(d) + (1− η)U (c2(α, θ))]
s.t. c2(α, θ) ≥ d,∀(α, θ).
In the sequel, we call a bank that never defaults a safe bank and denote the safe
strategy it chooses by (dS , yS).
Equilibrium without default
One of our objectives is to show that even a small amount of aggregate uncer-
tainty, as represented by a small but positive value of ε, can have large effects on
equilibrium values. Specifically, it can cause either high volatility of asset prices
or a non-neglible probability of default (or both). We begin by assuming that
there is no default in equilibrium and show that this implies a high volatility of
asset prices.
Examining the decision problem of the safe bank, above, it is clear that
this is a convex programming problem. Since the utility functions are strictly
concave, the decision problem has a unique solution and so there is no loss of
generality in assuming that all banks choose the same contract (dS , yS).
Since α represents purely idiosyncratic risk, the fraction of early consumers
in the economy is η(α¯, θ), where α¯ = (αH + αL)/2. Then at date 1 the total
demand for consumption is η(α¯, θ)d and the total supply is y and the market-
clearing condition requires that
η(α¯, θ)d ≤ y,∀θ,
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with the complementary slackness condition
η(α¯, θ)d < 1 =⇒ p(θ) = 1.
By definition, η(α¯, 0) < η(α¯, 1) so clearly the market-clearing condition η(α¯, 1)d ≤
y implies that η(α¯, 0)d < y. Then the complementary slackness condition im-
plies that p(0) = 1.
Equilibrium requires that the short asset must be held at date 0; otherwise
there can be no consumption at date 1. But since p(0) = 1 the short asset will
be dominated by the long asset at date 0 unless p(1) < 1/r. This shows that,
in the absence of default, asset-price volatility is unavoidable in equilibrium.
Furthermore, asset-price volatility is bounded away from zero for any value of
ε > 0 however small. Thus, only a very small amount of aggregate uncertainty
is needed to generate substantial price volatility.
The fact that all banks choose the same behavior is not essential to this
argument. As long as there is no default, the same argument applies when
there are multiple groups of banks. The essential feature of an equilibrum with
no default is that demand for and supply of liquidity are both inelastic. Then a
small shift in demand or supply can require a large change in the market-clearing
price.
To sum up the discussion so far:
Volatility or default: In equilibrium with ε > 0, there must be
either default or substantial asset-price volatility (or both).
Risky banks
Avoiding default is costly. To satisfy the incentive constraint c2(α, θ) ≥ d means
either choosing a small value of d, which distorts the intertemporal consumption
stream, or choosing a high value of y, which means foregoing the higher returns
on the long-term asset. If the costs of avoiding default are too great, it will
be optimal for the bank to choose a policy (d, y) that results in default with
positive probability. So in practice, there may also be some banks that choose
to default.
A bank defaults only if it violates the incentive constraint c2(α, θ) ≥ d in
some state. Since there are four possible combinations of the variables (α, θ),
there are several possible states in which a bank may default. We have to
consider all the possible combinations of default states in order to figure out
which is the optimal contract for the bank. For the sake of illustration, suppose
that the dominant factor in the bank’s decision is the variation in asset prices
and that a bank finds it optimal to default if and only if θ = 1 regardless
of the value of α. Then if θ = 0, the consumption of the early consumers
is d and the consumption of the late consumers is c2(α, 0). If θ = 1 the bank
defaults and everyone receives the liquidated value of the bank’s portfolio w(1) =
y+p(1)r(1−y). Thus, the decision problem of a bank anticipating default when
θ = 1 is to maximize
πE [αU(d) + (1− α)U (c2(α, 0)] + (1− π)U(y + p(1)r(1− y)),
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subject to the incentive constraint
c2(α, 0) ≥ d, α = αH , αL
We call this bank a risky bank and denote the risky strategy by (dR, yR).
Equilibrium with default
Given the assumption that the risky banks default in state θ = 1, regardless
of the value of α, there must be some banks that choose the safe strategy in
equilibrium. Otherwise, all the banks in the economy will default when θ = 1
and all will have to liquidate their assets. There will be no solvent banks to
purchase assets and the asset price p(1) will fall to zero. Clearly, this cannot be
an equilibrium because, anticipating the price p(1) = 0, the banks would find it
more profitable at date 0 to choose the safe strategy and make an unboundedly
large arbitrage profit at date 1. So, under our assumption that all risky banks
default in state θ = 1, any equilibrium with default is of necessity a mixed
equilibrium, that is, one with positive proportions of safe and risky banks.
To illustrate the possibility of a mixed equilibrium with two types of banks,
one safe and the other risky, we consider a numerical example with the following
parameters:
U(c) = loge c,
ε = 0.1,
π = 0.65,
(αH , αL) = (0.85, 0.75),
r = 1.5.
The equilibrium values are listed in Table 1.
Table 1
·
E[US ]
E[UR]
¸ ·
yS
yR
¸ 
¡
dS , c
S
2 (αL, 0), c
S
2 (αH , 0)
¢¡
dS , c
S
2 (αL, 1), c
S
2 (αH , 1)
¢¡
dR, c
R
2 (αL, 0), c
R
2 (αH , 0)
¢
(wR(1), wR(1), wR(1))


·
p(0)
p(1)
¸
·
0.077
0.077
¸ ·
0.809
0
¸ 
(0.995, 1.414, 1.624)
(0.995, 1.700, 1.366)
(1.360, 1.502, 1.502)
(0.678, 0.678, 0.678)


·
0.940
0.430
¸
Depositors must be indifferent between the safe and the risky bank in equi-
librium. The first column of Table 1 shows that the two types of banks yield
the same expected utility, as required. The second column shows that the safe
bank holds a large amount of liquidity in the form of the short asset whereas
the risky bank goes to the other extreme and holds no liquidity at all.
The safe bank gives early consumers the same consumption dS in all states.
The late consumers face risk. When the idiosyncratic shock is low (α = αL),
the safe bank has excess liquidity and can make profits buying up the long asset
14
at a low price in state θ = 0. So the late consumers do better when the price
is low (θ = 1) than in when it is high (θ = 0). When the idiosyncratic shock is
high (α = αH), the safe bank has insufficient liquidity and has to sell the long
asset to meet the demands of the early consumers. So the late consumers in the
safe bank do better when the price is high (θ = 0) than when it is low (θ = 1).
Depositors in the risky bank generally do well when the price is high (θ = 0).
The early consumers receive the constant amount dR and the late consumers
bear the risk of variations in α. When the price is low (θ = 1) the bank defaults
and all depositors receive the liquidated value of the bank’s portfolio, which is
low because of the fall in the asset price.
Notice that although the price is high when θ = 0, it is not equal to one, as
it would be if there were no default in θ = 1. Default introduces some elasticity
into the demand for liquidity, so the quantity of liquidity demanded can be the
same in both states.
Financial fragility
So far, we have illustrated an equilibrium in which there is high asset price
volatility and a high probability of default. Is this the same thing as “financial
fragility”? We think of financial fragility as meaning that small shocks can
produce a large effect on the system. If it takes very large shocks to produce
these effects, the financial system would be robust rather than fragile. But
what is large? And what is small? The usual way to establish that small shocks
have large consequences is to let ε become vanishingly small and show that the
impact of aggregate uncertainty does not disappear in the limit.
We have already shown that, in the absence of default, there must be high
asset-price volatility, for any value of ε > 0. Thus, we must have either high
asset-price volatility or default (or both) when ε > 0. We can use this fact to
demonstrate that the asset-price volatility does not disappear as ε → 0. So in
the limit as ε→ 0 the consequences of small shocks become disproportionately
large and we have an example of financial fragility. The proof of this result is
by contradiction. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that asset-price
volatility becomes vanishingly small as ε → 0. By our earlier result (Volatility
or Default), this implies that there must be default in equilibrium for arbitrarily
small values of ε→ 0. Then we can find a subsequence of equilibria, correspond-
ing to values of ε→ 0, such that (i) asset prices converge to a constant and (ii) it
is optimal to choose default in each of the equilibria in the sequence. In Section
6 we show that the limit of equilibria as ε → 0 is an equilibrium of the limit
economy. We will also show that p(0) = p(1) = 1/r if there is no volatility in
the limit equilibrium. Note that, if it is optimal for a bank to choose default
when ε > 0, it will be optimal in the limit. However, if there is no asset price
volatility, the only reason for defaulting is because α is too high. Comparing the
utility of the safe and the risky bank, we can check that the risky bank’s strategy
is not optimal. This is a contradiction of our claim that default is optimal as
ε → 0. This contradiction forces us to conclude that asset-price volatility does
not disappear in the limit.
The financial fragility of equilibrium as ε → 0 is really the central result of
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this paper but the interpretation of this result requires some care. What we have
established so far is that small liquidity shocks cause a large amount of asset
price volatility. This does not necessarily imply that small liquidity shocks have
a large impact on the allocation of consumption and risk and hence on expected
utility. In fact, the impact of price variations on consumption and risk depends
on the idiosyncratic shocks α. Examining the bank’s budget constraints above
it is clear that a change in asset prices has a wealth effect if and only if there
is an imbalance between the bank’s supply of liquidity y and the depositors’
demand for liquidity η(α, θ)d. If α is random, then for any choice of d and y
there is a positive probability that αd 6= y and prices have a wealth effect.
By contrast, if α is a non-stochastic constant, then in the limit as ε→ 0, the
bank can achieve the optimal expected utility while remaining autarkic. Price
changes have no effect because the bank does not have a net excess demand for
liquidity at date 1.
Another point to note about equilibrium in the limit as ε → 0 is that,
although it is optimal for banks to default, none of the banks chooses to do
so. In other words, when α is non-stochastic the proportion of risky banks
converges to zero. This is a very special case but it warns us against jumping
to conclusions about the incidence of default in equilibrium.
We can sum up our discussion as follows:
Financial fragility: Asset-price volatility is bounded away from
zero in the limit as ε → 0. The effect of volatility depends on the
presence of idiosyncratic risk : this asset price volatility has an effect
on the allocation of consumption and risk in the limit if and only if
α is stochastic.
Robustness of financial fragility
In addition to showing that small shocks can have large consequences, we can
use the analysis of the limiting behavior of equilibria to test the robustness of
certain other kinds of equilibria.
In the limit economy, where ε = 0, there is no aggregate uncertainty and yet
the endogenous variables such as prices exhibit aggregate (extrinsic) uncertainty.
This is nothing but a sunspot equilibrium of the limit economy. We can therefore
think of our analysis of what happens in the limit as providing some justification
for sunspot equilibria. The limit economy has other kinds of equilibria, but these
are not the limit of equilibria as ε → 0. In other words, financial fragility is a
robust phenomenon.
The presence of multiple equilibria of different types makes the analysis of
what happens in the limit technically difficult. We offer a classification of these
equilibria in the following section.
6 Analysis
In this section we proceed to characterize the set of equilibria of the model by
considering several different cases. We begin by analyzing the equilibria of the
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limit economy with no aggregate uncertainty (ε = 0) and here we distinguish
two sub-cases. In Section 6.2, we consider the economy in which there are
no idiosyncratic or bank-specific shocks to liquidity demand. This is the case
where α is non-stochastic. Then in Section 6.3 we consider the case where
banks are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to liquidity demand. This is the case
where α is stochastic. The difference between these two cases is that, asset-
price fluctuations necessarily have real effects if and only if α is stochastic.
Then we consider economies with aggregate uncertainty (ε > 0). Our two main
results, Volatility or Default (Theorem 3) and Financial Fragility (Theorem 5)
are contained in Section 6.4.
6.1 Equilibria with ε = 0
In this section we first characterize the equilibria of the limit economy in which
ε = 0. There is no aggregate intrinsic uncertainty in the model, but there may
still be aggregate extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots). We first classify equilibria
in the limit economy according to the impact of extrinsic uncertainty. An equi-
librium (m,ρ, d, y, p) in the limit economy is a fundamental equilibrium (F) if
x(di, yi, α, θ) is constant for each i and α and if p(θ) is constant. In that case,
the sunspot variable θ has no influence on the equilibrium values. An equilib-
rium (m, ρ, d, y, p) of the limit economy is a trivial sunspot equilibrium (T) if
x(di, yi, α, θ) is constant for each i and α and p(θ) is not constant. In this case,
the sunspot variable θ has no effect on the allocation of consumption but it does
affect the equilibrium price p(θ). An equilibrium (m, ρ, d, y, p) which is neither
an F nor a T is called a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium (N), that is, an N is an
equilibrium in which the sunspot variable has some non-trivial impact on the
allocation of consumption.
We can also classify equilibria according to the variety of choices made by
different groups of banks. An equilibrium (m, ρ, d, y, p) is pure if each group of
banks makes the same choice:
(di, yi) = (dj , yj),∀i, j = 1, ...,m.
An equilibrium (m, ρ, d, y, p) is semi-pure if the consumption allocations are the
same for each group of banks:
x(di, yi, α, θ) = x(dj , yj , α, θ),∀i, j = 1, ...,m.
Otherwise, (m, ρ, d, y, p) is a mixed equilibrium where different types of bank
provide different allocations (but the same ex ante expected utility). The role
of mixed equilibria is to ensure the existence of equilibrium in the presence of
non-convexities.
6.2 Equilibrium with ε = 0 and non-stochastic α
In the special case with α constant the following theorem partitions the equi-
librium set into two cases with distinctive properties.
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Theorem 1 Suppose that α is constant and let (ρ,m, x, y, p) be an equilibrium
of the limit economy, in which ε = 0. There are two possibilities:
(i) (ρ,m, x, y, p) is a semi-pure, fundamental equilibrium
in which the probability of default is zero;
(ii) (ρ,m, x, y, p) is a pure, trivial sunspot equilibrium
in which the probability of default is zero.
Proof. See Section 8.
By definition, an equilibrium must be either an F, T, or N. What Theorem 1
shows is that an N does not occur and each of the remaining cases is associated
with distinctive properties in terms of symmetry and probability of default.
Because the incentive constraint does not bind in either the F or T, both
achieve the first-best or Pareto-efficient allocation. No equilibrium can do bet-
ter. Any bank can guarantee this level of utility by choosing αdi = yi, where
di is the deposit contract chosen in the F. For this choice of (di, yi) prices have
no effect on the bank’s budget constraint and the depositors will receive the
first-best consumption. In an N, by contrast, agents receive noisy consumption
allocations. Because they are risk averse, the noise in their consumption alloca-
tions is inefficient. This violates the equilibrium condition that depositors must
be indifferent between the two types of banks.
6.3 Equilibrium with ε = 0 and stochastic α
In economies with stochastic α, individual banks face idiosyncratic risk. For
some choices of (di, yi) a bank may be forced to default in some states. More
importantly, the bank may find it optimal to choose (di, yi) so that default oc-
curs with positive probability, because the costs of avoiding default are greater
than the benefits. In order to distinguish crises caused by aggregate extrinsic
uncertainty from defaults caused by idiosyncratic shocks, in the sequel we as-
sume that the parameters of model are such that default is never optimal in the
F. In that case, the bank’s optimal choice of (di, yi) must satisfy the incentive
constraint, so the bank’s optimal decision problem can be written as follows.
At the equilibrium price p¯ = 1/r, the value of the bank’s assets at date 1 is
yi + p¯r(1 − yi) = 1, independently of the choice of yi. In the absence of de-
fault, the budget constraint implies that the consumption at date 2 is given by
r(1−αdi)/(1−α). The incentive constraint requires that r(1−αdi)/(1−α) ≥ di.
Thus, the decision problem can be written as:
max E [αU(di) + (1− α)U (r(1− αdi)/(1− α))]
st r(1− αdi)/(1− α) ≥ di,∀α.
This is a convex programming problem and has a unique solution for di. As
noted, yi is indeterminate, but the equilibrium allocation must satisfy the
market-clearing condition X
i
ρiα¯di =
X
i
ρiyi
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where α¯ = E [α]. Note that there is a single pure F (ρ,m, d, y, p¯), in which
yi = E [αdi] for every i = 1, ...,m.
In the case of idiosyncratic shocks, the following theorem partitions the
equilibrium set into two cases, F and N.
Theorem 2 Let (ρ,m, d, y, p) be an equilibrium of the limit economy, in which
ε = 0. There are two possibilities:
(i) (ρ,m, d, y, p) is a semi-pure, fundamental equilibrium
in which the probability of default is zero;
(ii) (ρ,m, d, y, p) is a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium
which is pure if the probability of default is zero.
Proof. See Section 8.
The fundamental equilibrium is semi-pure for the usual reasons and there is
no default by assumption. Unlike the case with no idiosyncratic shocks (non-
stochastic α), there can be no trivial sunspot equilibrium. To see this, suppose
that some bank group i with measure ρi chooses (di, yi) and that default occurs
with positive probability. Then consumption for both early and late consumers
is equal to yi+p(θ)r(1−yi), which is independent of p(θ) only if yi = 1. In that
case there is no point in choosing d > 1 and so no need for default. If there is
no probability of default, then the consumption of the late consumers is
yi + p(θ)r(1− yi)− αdi
(1− α)p(θ) .
This is independent of p(θ) only if yi = αdi, which cannot hold unless α is a
constant. Thus, there can be no T.
The only remaining possibility is an N. If the probability of default is zero,
then the bank’s decision problem is a convex programming problem and the
usual methods suffice to show uniqueness of the optimum choice of (d, y) under
the maintained assumptions.
The properties of equilibria in the limit economy are summarized in the
following table.
Symmetry Type Default
Semi-pure F No
Pure T No
Mixed or pure N Possible
6.4 The limit of equilibria as ε& 0
According to the definition of equilibrium in Section 4, prices p(θ) and con-
sumption x(·, θ) are functions of θ. When ε = 0, a change in θ has no effect
on preferences, so any dependence of p(θ) or x(·, θ) on θ represents extrinsic
uncertainty. When ε > 0, on the other hand, a change in θ has an effect on
preference, so any dependence of p(θ) or x(·, θ) on θ represents intrinsic uncer-
tainty. Thus, an equilibrium for an economy with aggregate uncertainty, ε > 0,
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is by definition “fundamental” in the sense that endogenous variables depend
only on real exogenous shocks. To avoid confusion with the fundamental equi-
librium in the limit economy with ε = 0, we use the letter A to denote equilibria
with aggregate uncertainty.
The next theorem characterizes the properties of equilibria in perturbed
economies.
Theorem 3 Default or Volatility Let (m, ρ, d, y, p) denote an A. Then ei-
ther there is a positive probability of default or there is non-trivial price volatility,
i.e., p(θ) = 1 with positive probability and p(θ) < 1/r with positive probability.
Proof. See Section 8.
We note several other properties of equilibrium with ε > 0. First, there
cannot be a state in which all banks are in default, for this would imply p(θ) = 0
which is inconsistent with equilibrium. Hence, any equilibrium with default
must be mixed. Secondly, as we have seen, if there is no default there must be
a positive probability that p(θ) = 1. Finally, in the absence of default, for any
value of ε > 0, the volatility of asset prices, as measured by the variance of p(·),
is bounded away from zero. Both assets are held at date 0 in equilibrium and
this requires that the high returns to the long asset, associated with p(θ) = 1,
must be balanced by low returns associated with p(θ) < 1/r. These properties
are all preserved in the limit as ε→ 0.
The next result shows that the limit of a sequence of equilibria is an equi-
librium in the limit.
Theorem 4 Consider a sequence of perturbed economies corresponding to ε =
1/q, where q is a positive integer, and let (mq, ρq, dq, yq, pq) be the corresponding
As. For some convergent subsequence q ∈ Q let
(m0, ρ0, d0, y0, p0) = lim
q∈Q
(mq, ρq, dq, yq, pq).
If d0i > 0, and 0 < y
0
i < 1 for i = 1, ...,m
0 then (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is an
equilibrium of the limit economy.
Proof. See Section 8.
Theorem 4 shows that, under certain conditions, the limit of a sequence of
equilibria as ε→ 0 is an equilibrium of the limit economy where ε = 0. We are
also interested in the opposite question, namely, which equilibria of the limit
economy in which ε = 0 are limits of equilibria from the perturbed economy in
which ε > 0? This requirement of lower hemi-continuity is a test of robustness:
if a small perturbation of the limit economy causes an equilibrium to disappear,
we argue that the equilibrium is not robust. Since there are many equilibria of
the limit economy, it is of interest to see whether any of these equilibria can be
eliminated by being shown to be non-robust.
We have shown in Theorem 3 that equilibria of the perturbed economy are
characterized by default or non-trivial asset price uncertainty. Furthermore,
because the random variable θ has a finite support, the probability of these
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events is bounded away from zero, uniformly in ε. The fundamental equilibrium
of the limit economy with ε = 0 has none of these properties. However, this
does not by itself prove that the fundamental equilibrium is not robust. It could
be the limit of a sequence of equilibria of the perturbed economy if the fraction
of banks that defaults in equilibrium converges to zero as q → ∞. However, if
the fundamental equilibrium were the limit referred to in Theorem 4, then it
must be the case that (a) default is optimal in the limit and (b) there is no price
volatility in the limit. These two properties can be shown to be inconsistent.
This contradiction shows that asset-price volatility is bounded away from zero
in the limit as the shocks become vanishingly small. In other words, the model
exhibits financial fragility. As we have seen already, this asset-price volatility
has real effects if and only if there is idiosyncratic risk (α is stochastic).
Theorem 5 Financial Fragility If (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is the equilibrium of
the limit economy mentioned in Theorem 4, then (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is not an F
of the limit economy. In fact, the limiting equilibrium (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) will be
an N if α is a non-degenerate random variable and a T if α is a constant.
Proof. Suppose that, contrary to what we wish to prove, (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0)
is the fundamental equilibrium. Then p0(θ) = 1/r < 1 with probability one
and, hence, pq(θ) < 1 for all θ and all q sufficiently large. From Theorem 3 we
know that this implies some group i defaults with positive probability for all
sufficiently large q. Thus, in the limit, default must be optimal for group i and
ρ
q
i → ρ0i = 0. However, we assumed in Section 6.3 that default is not optimal for
stochastic α and it is clear that it is not optimal with non-stochastic α because
U(1) < max
αc1+(1−α)c2/r=1
{αU(c1) + (1− α)U (c2)} .
This contradiction proves that (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is not an F, i.e., the F is not
robust. This implies that the limiting equilibrium is either an N or a T. Which
case obtains depends on the idiosyncratic shocks α.
If α is a constant, the first best can be achieved by an autarkic bank when
ε = 0 and this implies that the equilibrium allocation must be non-stochastic
in the limit. So (m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is a T if α is a constant.
Consider then the case where α is a non-degenerate random variable. For
each n, either asset-price volatility is bounded away from zero (uniformly in
n) or default is optimal. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that
(m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) is a T. Then the limiting allocation is non-stochastic. This
implies that p0(θ) = 1/r with probability one and that default is optimal in
the limit. But we have assumed that variations in α are not sufficient to make
default optimal at this price. This contradiction implies that p0 is not a constant.
When α is random any changes in prices have real effects so the equilibrium
(m0, ρ0, x0, y0, p0) cannot be a T, i.e., it must be an N.
Thus, we have shown that F is not robust (not the limit of a sequence of
equilibria of the perturbed economy) and conversely, there must be intrinsic
uncertainty in any robust equilibrium. So this approach of regarding sunspot
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equilibria as a limiting case selects the sunspot equilibria as the only robust
equilibria. Furthermore, the intrinsic uncertainty is non-trivial, i.e., has real
effects, except in the special case where α is a constant. These results are
illustrated in Figure 1.
Corresponding types of equilibria
– Place Figure 1 here –
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have defined financial fragility in terms of excess sensitivity to
small shocks. This led us to investigate the relationship between intrinsic and
extrinsic uncertainty in a model of financial crises. Our general approach is to
regard extrinsic uncertainty as a limiting case of intrinsic uncertainty. In our
model, small shocks to the demand for liquidity are always associated with large
fluctuations in asset prices. In this sense, the system is financial fragile. In the
limit, as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small, the model converges to
one with extrinsic uncertainty.
The limit economy has three kinds of equilibria,
• fundamental equilibria, in which there is neither aggregate uncertainty nor
a positive probability of crisis;
• trivial sunspot equilibria, in which prices fluctuate but the real allocation
is the same as in the fundamental equilibrium;
• and non-trivial sunspot equilibria, in which prices fluctuate and financial
crises can occur with positive probability.
Introducing small shocks into the limit economy destabilizes the first type of
equilibrium, leaving the second and third as possible limits of equilibria of the
perturbed economy. If α is a constant, the limiting equilibrium as ε → 0 is a
trivial sunspot equilibrium, in which price fluctuations have no real effects. If α
is random, the limiting equilibrium as ε→ 0 is a non-trivial sunspot equilibrium,
in which price fluctuations have a real effect on consumption and expected
utility. We argue that only the sunspot equilibria are robust, in the sense that a
small perturbation of the model causes a small change in these equilibria. This
selection criterion provides an argument for the relevance of extrinsic uncertainty
and the necessity of financial crises.
At the heart of our theory is a pecuniary externality: when one group of
banks defaults and liquidates its assets, it forces down the price of assets and this
may cause another group of banks to default. This pecuniary externality may be
interpreted as a form of contagion. Allen and Gale (2000a) describes a model of
contagion in a multi-region economy. Bankruptcy is assumed to be costly: long-
term projects can be liquidated prematurely but a fraction of the returns are lost.
This deadweight loss from liquidation creates a spillover effect in the adjacent
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regions where the claims on the bankrupt banks are held. If the spillover effect
is large enough, the banks in the adjacent regions will also be forced into default
and liquidation. Each successive wave of bankruptcies increases the loss of value
and strengthens the impact of the spillover effect on the next region. Under
certain conditions, a shock to one small region can propagate throughout the
economy. By contrast, in the present model, a bank’s assets are always marked
to market. Given the equilibrium asset price p, bankruptcy does not change the
value of the bank’s portfolio. However, if a group of banks defaults, the resulting
change in the price p may cause other banks to default, which will cause further
changes in p, and so on. The “contagion” in both models is instantaneous.
Several features of the model are special and deserve further consideration.
Pecuniary externalities “matter” in our model because markets are incom-
plete: if banks could trade Arrow securities contingent on the states θ, they
would be able to insure themselves against changes in asset values (Allen and
Gale (2003)). With a complete set of Arrow securities, risk sharing must be
efficient, so in the absence of intrinsic uncertainty (ε = 0) the only possible
equilibrium is the one we have called the fundamental equilibrium. The equilib-
rium allocation is incentive-efficient, sunspots have no real impact, and there are
no crises. Note that, although the existence of the markets for Arrow securities
has an effect (by eliminating the other equilibria), there is no trade in Arrow
securities in the fundamental equilibrium. Arrow securities are, of course, a
convenient fiction that do not exist in reality, but it may be that other deriva-
tives, such as options, would serve as well. Derivatives are conditional on p(θ),
however, rather than directly on θ, so it is not obvious how many derivatives or
what kind would be required. This is an interesting topic for future research.
We have noted the importance of inelastic demand for liquidity in generating
large fluctuations in asset prices from small demand shocks. The inelasticity of
demand follows two assumptions. The first is the assumption that banks use
demand deposits, which do not allow the payment at date 1 to be contingent on
demand (or anything else). The second is the assumption of Diamond-Dybvig
preferences, which rule out interemporal substitution of consumption. We see
both the Diamond-Dybvig preferences and the use of demand deposits as a
counterpart to the empirical fact that financial contracts are typically written
in a “hard” way that requires strict performance of precisely defined acts, in-
dependently of many apparently relevant contingencies. These hard contracts
may be motivated by enforcement and incentive problems, but it would be too
difficult to include them explicitly in the model. There seems little doubt that
such factors are relevant in real markets and should be taken into account here.
An alternative justification for incomplete contracts is that they provide a
way of modeling, within the standard, Walrasian, auction-market framework,
some realistic features of alternative market-clearing mechanisms. In an auction
market, prices and quantities adjust simultaneously in a tatonnement process
until a full equilibrium is achieved. An alternative mechanism is one in which
quantities are chosen before prices are allowed to adjust. An example is the
use of market orders in markets for company stocks. In the banking context, if
depositors were required to make a withdrawal decision before the asset price
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was determined in the interbank market, the same inelasticity of demand would
be observed even if depositors had preferences that allowed for intertemporal
substitution. There may be other institutional structures that have the quali-
tative features of our example. An investigation of these issues goes far beyond
the scope of the present paper, but it is undoubtedly one of the most important
topics for future research.
The model of banks that we have used is special, but the same general
arguments apply to other types of intermediary. As long as intermediaries use
non-contingent contracts and markets are incomplete, there will be a risk of
default when there is extreme price volatility.
In this paper we have ignored the possibility of intervention by the central
bank or government. A full understanding of the laisser-faire case should be
seen as a prelude to the analysis of optimal intervention. In the same way, the
analysis of a “real” model is a prelude to the introduction of fiat money into
the model. These are both important topics for future research.
8 Proofs
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
By definition, an equilibrium (ρ,m, d, y, p) must be either an F, T, or N. The
theorem is proved by considering each case in turn.
Case (i). If (ρ,m, d, y, p) is an F then by definition the price p(θ) is constant
and, for each group i, the consumption allocation x(di, yi, α, θ) is constant. In
particular, x1(di, yi, α, θ) = di with probability one so there is no default in
equilibrium.
Let p¯ denote the constant price and ci = (ci1, ci2) the consumption allocation
chosen by banks in group i. The decision problem of a bank in group i is
max [αU(ci1) + (1− α)U(ci2)]
s.t. ci1 ≤ ci2, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
αci1 + (1− α)p¯ci2 ≤ yi + p¯r(1− yi).
Clearly, yi will be chosen to maximize yi+ p¯r(1− yi). Then the strict concavity
of U(·) implies that ci is uniquely determined and independent of i. Thus, the
equilibrium is semi-pure: ci = cj for any i and j.
Case (ii). Suppose that (ρ,m, d, y, p) is a T. Then by definition p(θ) is
not constant and, for each group i, the consumption allocation x(di, yi, α, θ) is
constant. In particular, x1(di, yi, α, θ) = di with probability one so there is no
default in equilibrium.
Let ci denote the consumption allocation chosen by banks in group i. The
budget constraint at date 1 reduces to
αci1 − yi = −p(θ)((1− α)αci2 − r(1− yi)), a.s.
Since p(θ) is not constant, this equation can be satisfied only if
αci1 − yi = (1− α)ci2 − r(1− yi) = 0.
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Then the choice of (ci, yi) must solve the problem
max E [αU(ci1) + (1− α)U(ci2)]
s.t. ci1 ≤ ci2, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
αci1 = yi, (1− α)ci2 = r(1− yi).
The strict concavity of U(·) implies that this problem uniquely determines the
value of ci and hence yi, independently of i. Consequently, the equilibrium is
pure.
Case (iii). Suppose that (ρ,m, d, y, p) is an N. The allocation of consumption
for group i is x(di, yi, α, θ), and the expected utility of each group is the same
E [u(x(di, yi, α, θ), α] = E [u(x(dj , yj , α, θ), α] ,∀i, j.
The mean allocation
P
i ρix(di, yi, α, θ) satisfies the market clearing conditions
for every θ and hence consumption bundle E [
P
i ρix(di, yi, α, θ)] is feasible for
the planner. Since agents are strictly risk averse,
u
Ã
E
"X
i
ρix(di, yi, α, θ)
#
, α
!
>
X
i
ρiE [u(x(di, yi, α, θ), α)] .
This contradicts the equilibrium conditions, since the individual bank could
choose
y0 = αd0 = αE
"X
i
ρix(di, yi, α, θ)
#
and achieve a higher utility.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Again we let (ρ,m, d, y, p) be a fixed but arbitrary equilibrium and consider each
of three cases in turn.
Case (i). If (ρ,m, d, y, p) is an F, p(θ) is constant and, for each group i
and each α, the consumption allocation x(di, yi, α, θ) is constant. In particular,
x1(di, yi, α, θ) = di with probability one so there is no default in equilibrium.
Let p¯ denote the constant price and ci(α) = (ci1(α), ci2(α)) the consumption
allocation chosen by banks in group i. The decision problem of a bank in group
i is
max E [αU(ci1(α)) + (1− α)U(ci2(α))]
s.t. ci1(α) ≤ ci2(α), 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1
αci1(α) + (1− α)p¯ci2(α) ≤ yi + p¯r(1− yi).
Clearly, yi will be chosen to maximize yi+ p¯r(1− yi). Then the strict concavity
of U(·) implies that ci(α) is uniquely determined and independent of i (but not
of α). Thus, the equilibrium is semi-pure: ci = cj for any i and j.
Case (ii). Suppose that (ρ,m, d, y, p) is a T. Then by definition p(θ) is not
constant and, for each group i and α, the consumption allocation x(di, yi, α, θ)
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is constant. In particular, x1(di, yi, α, θ) = di with probability one so there is
no default in equilibrium.
Let ci(α) denote the consumption allocation chosen by banks in group i.
The budget constraint at date 1 reduces to
αci1(α)− yi = −p(θ)((1− α)αci2(α)− r(1− yi)), a.s.
Since p(θ) is not constant, this equation can be satisfied only if
αci1(α)− yi = (1− α)ci2(α)− r(1− yi) = 0.
Since α is not constant this can only be true if ci1(α) = ci2(α) = 0, a contradic-
tion. Thus, there cannot be a T when α is not constant.
Case (iii). The only remaining possibility is that (ρ,m, d, y, p) is an N. If
there is no default in this equilibrium, then each bank in group i solves the
problem
max E
h
αU(di) + (1− α)U
³
yi+p(θ)r(1−yi)−αdi
(1−α)p(θ)
´i
st yi+p(θ)r(1−yi)(1−α)p(θ) ≥ di.
This is a convex programming problem and it is easy to show that the strict
concavity of U(·) uniquely determines (di, yi). Thus an N without default is
pure.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that the probability of default in (ρ,m, d, y, p) is zero. Then for each
group i, x1(di, yi, α, θ) = di and the market-clearing condition (2) impliesX
i
E [ρiη(α, θ)] di ≤
X
i
ρiyi. (3)
There are two cases to consider. In the first case,
P
i ρiyi = 0. Then di = 0 for
every i and the utility achieved in equilibrium is
E
·
η(α, θ)U(0) + (1− η(α, θ))U
µ
r
1− η(α, θ)
¶¸
.
By holding a small amount δ > 0 of the short asset, positive consumption could
be guaranteed at the first date. Optimality requires that
E
·
η(α, θ)U
µ
δ
η(α, θ)
¶¸
+E
·
(1− η(α, θ))U
µ
r(1− δ)
1− η(α, θ)
¶¸
≤ E
·
η(α, θ)U(0) + (1− η(α, θ))U
µ
r
1− η(α, θ)
¶¸
.
for any δ > 0. In the limit as δ → 0,
E [U 0 (0)]−E
·
U 0
µ
r
1− η(α, θ)
¶¸
≤ 0,
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which contradicts the assumption that U 0(0) =∞.
In the second case,
P
i ρiyi > 0. Then the market-clearing condition (3) and
the fact that η(α, θ) = α+ εθ together imply thatX
i
ρiη(α, θ)di <
X
i
ρiyi
with positive probability. The complementary slackness condition implies that
p(θ) = 1 with positive probability and the short asset will be dominated by the
long asset at date 0 unless p(θ) < 1/r with positive probability. Thus, the price
volatility is non-trivial if the probability of default is zero.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Continuity and the convergence of {(ρq,m, dq, yq, pq)} immediately implies the
following properties of the limit point (ρ0,m, d0, y0, p0):
(i)
P
i ρ
0
i = 1 and ρ
0
i ≥ 0 for every i so (ρ0,m) is a partition.
(ii) For every i, (d0i , y
0
i ) ∈ R+ × [0, 1]. The market-clearing conditionsX
i
ρ0iE
£
αx¯1(d
0
i , y
0
i , α, θ)|θ
¤
≤
X
i
ρ0i y
0
i ,
andX
i
ρ0iE
©
αx¯1(d
0
i , y
0
i , α, θ) + (1− α)x¯2(d0i , y0i , α, θ)|θ
ª
=
X
i
ρ0i
©
y0i + r(1− y0i )
ª
are satisfied in the limit and the complementary slackness condition holds. Thus,
(d0, y0) is an attainable allocation.
It remains to show that (d0i , y
0
i ) is optimal for each i. Let W
q(di, yi, α, θ)
denote the utility associated with the pair (di, yi) in the perturbed economy
corresponding to ε = 1/q when the price function is pq and let W 0(di, yi, α, θ)
denote the utility associated with the pair (di, yi) in the limit economy cor-
responding to ε = 0, where the price function is p0. The function W 0i (·) is
discontinuous at the bankruptcy point defined implicitly by the condition¡
α+ (1− α)p0(θ)
¢
di = yi + p
0(θ)r(1− yi). (4)
If (4) occurs with probability zero in the limit, then it is easy to see from the
assumed convergence properties that
W q(di, yi, α, θ)→W 0(di, yi, α, θ), a.s.
and hence
lim
q→∞
E [W q(di, yi, α, θ)] = E
£
W 0(di, yi, α, θ)
¤
.
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Let (d0i , y
0
i ) denote the pair corresponding to the limiting consumption allocation
x0i and let {(dqi , yqi )} denote the sequence of equilibrium choices converging to
(d0i , y
0
i ). There may exist a set of states (α, θ) with positive measure such that
(dqi , y
q
i ) implies default in state (α, θ) for arbitrarily large q but that (d
0
i , y
0
i )
does not imply default in state (α, θ). Then at least we can say that
lim inf
q
W q(dqi , y
q
i , α, θ) ≤W 0(d0i , y0i , α, θ), a.s.
and this implies that
lim inf
q
E [W q(dqi , y
q
i , α, θ)] ≤ E
£
W 0(d0i , y
0
i , α, θ)
¤
.
Now suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that (d0i , y
0
i ) is not optimal.
Then there exists a pair (di, yi) such thatE
£
W 0(di, yi, α, θ)
¤
> E
£
W 0(d0i , y
0
i , α, θ)
¤
.
If di = 0 then (4) holds with probability zero and it is clear that for some suffi-
ciently large value of q, E
£
W 0(di, yi, α, θ)
¤
> E [W q(dqi , y
q
i , α, θ)], contradicting
the equilibrium conditions. If di > 0, then either the critical condition (4) holds
with probability zero or we can find a slightly lower value d0 < d that does
satisfy the critical condition. To see this, note first that the critical condition
uniquely determines the value of p0(θ) as long as
(1− α)d 6= r(1− y)
which is true for almost every value of d. Secondly, if the value of p0(θ) for
which the critical condition is satisfied is an atom, we can always find a slightly
smaller value d0i < di such that the value of p
0(θ) for which the critical condition
is satisfied is not an atom. Furthermore, reducing d slightly will at most reduce
the payoff by a small amount, so for d0i < di and close enough to di we still have
E
£
W 0(d0i, yi, α, θ)
¤
> E
£
W 0(d0i , y
0
i , α, θ)
¤
. Then this leads to a contradiction
in the usual way.
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Figure 1A 
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Figure 1B 
Equilibrium correspondence 
Non-stochastic α 
 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between equilibria of the perturbed economy (ε > 0) 
and equilibria of the limit economy (ε = 0). In the perturbed economy, asset-price 
volatility is bounded away from zero as ε becomes vanishingly small. In the limit 
economy, there are three types of equilibria, F, N, and T. Since there are no price 
fluctuations in F, it cannot be the limit of a sequence of perturbed equilibria. Thus, the 
only robust equilibria are N, if α is stochastic, and T, if α is non-stochastic.  
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